











Overweighting Private Information:  

















The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author. 
 
 
   Overweighting Private Information:
Three Measures, One Bias?∗
Gerlinde Fellner†and Sebastian Kr¨ ugel‡
August 25, 2010
Abstract
Overweighting private information is often used to explain vari-
ous detrimental decisions. In behavioral economics and ﬁnance, it is
usually modeled as a direct consequence of misperceiving signal re-
liability. This bias is typically dubbed overconﬁdence and linked to
the judgment literature in psychology. Empirical tests of the models
often fail to ﬁnd evidence for the predicted eﬀects of overconﬁdence.
These studies assume, however, that a speciﬁc type of overconﬁdence,
i.e., “miscalibration,” captures the underlying trait. We challenge this
assumption and borrow the psychological methodology of single-cue
probability learning to obtain a direct measure for overweighting pri-
vate information. We ﬁnd that overweighting private information and
measures of “miscalibration” are unrelated, indicating that diﬀerent
kinds of misperceptions are at work. Thus, in order to test the the-
oretical predictions of the overconﬁdence literature in economics and
ﬁnance, one cannot rely on the well-established “miscalibration” bias.
We ﬁnd no gender diﬀerences in overconﬁdence for our measures ex-
cept for one, where women are more overconﬁdent than men.
JEL classiﬁcation: C91; D03; D83
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Among theorists in behavioral economics and ﬁnance, overweighting private
information is a bias commonly used to explain some “real world” phenom-
ena. It has been suggested, for instance, as an explanation for the high
trading volume observed in ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Odean, 1998, Kyle and
Wang, 1997, Benos, 1998), for the winner’s curse in common value auctions
(Weyl, 2006), and for short-term market underreactions and long-term mar-
ket overreactions (Daniel et al., 1998). In these studies, overweighting private
information is modeled as a direct consequence of a biased belief about the
precision of information (i.e., misperception of signal reliability). That is,
an agent who overestimates the precision of his private information, over-
weights this information when updating his beliefs and therefore acts to his
detriment. Overestimating the precision of private information is usually
dubbed as “being overconﬁdent,” and a link is drawn to a ﬁnding in the psy-
chological literature that individuals often overestimate the precision of their
knowledge. The latter phenomenon is also called “miscalibration,” and it is
known to be a speciﬁc type of overconﬁdence. In the economics and ﬁnance
literature, overconﬁdence (or miscalibration) is therefore considered to be the
underlying trait of individuals who overweight their private information.
Based on the theoretical literature, a few empirical studies have tried to
ﬁnd evidence for the modeled eﬀects of overconﬁdence (e.g., Biais et al., 2005,
Glaser and Weber, 2007). In these studies, overconﬁdence (or miscalibration)
is usually assessed by asking individuals to provide conﬁdence intervals for
several knowledge questions. It is well known that in these tasks, individu-
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intervals are too narrow. Seemingly opposed to the theory, however, mis-
calibration does not trigger the causal path implied by the above mentioned
models: “Measures of miscalibration are, contrary to the predictions of over-
conﬁdence models, unrelated to measures of trading volume” (Glaser and
Weber, 2007). We argue that such a conclusion is to some extent premature
because it heavily relies on the assumption that overestimating the preci-
sion of (private) information and overestimating the precision of knowledge
together reﬂect a unitary construct. To the best of our knowledge, this as-
sumption has never been tested, and in view of some related literature it is
at least questionable whether it indeed holds.
Several authors in the psychological literature, for instance, have argued
in favor of distinguishing between two types of uncertainty: one that is lo-
cated in the external world and one that is located in the individual himself
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1982, Keren, 1991). When general knowledge
questions are asked to obtain measures of miscalibration, the uncertainty is
internally located in the individual. Such a task might be more a test of
metacognition: “assessors are asked for their knowledge about knowledge”
(Keren, 1991). Regarding overweighting of private information, however, the
uncertainty is located in the external world, speciﬁcally in the information
an individual receives. The question is whether an individual misperceives
the uncertainty inherent in private information in the same way as he mis-
perceives internal uncertainty when answering knowledge questions.
Beyond this general argument, we also want to point to the literature on
forecasting, which clearly distinguishes between three types of forecasting or
3
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there is (i) forecasting or judgment based on information that is not explicitly
available as external data but is held in memory, (ii) forecasting of a variable
based on previous values of that variable, and (iii) forecasting of a variable
based on explicitly available information about the value of another variable.
The bias incorporated in the above mentioned models revolves around the
third type of task. However, the bias measured in the empirical studies bears
on the ﬁrst (and second) type of task.1 Once again, the question remains
whether all three types of tasks expose similar personal traits.
This is precisely the question we address in the present study. We rely
on a methodology from the literature in psychology on single-cue probability
learning (SCPL) to obtain individual measures regarding the weighting of
information. In SCPL experiments, subjects predict an outcome based on
a single cue over a number of trials. For each subject a prediction slope
(subjects’ predictions regressed on the corresponding cues) is then compared
to the normative slope (true outcome values regressed on the corresponding
cues). Subjects who overweight their signals exhibit a prediction slope that
is steeper than the normative slope. Thus, using this methodology we are
able to obtain a measure that captures the overweighting of information bias
directly. Our study is the ﬁrst to relate this measure to the two measures
of miscalibration which are typically employed in the empirical economics
literature: miscalibration with respect to general knowledge questions and
1Biais et al. (2005) employ only a judgment task of type (i) to obtain a measure of
miscalibration. Glaser and Weber (2007) employ tasks of type (i) and (ii) to obtain two
measures of miscalibration: one measure based on knowledge questions and the other based
on time series predictions. However, neither measure is related to the relevant economic
variable (i.e., trading volume in their studies).
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upon the same underlying trait, individuals who are most miscalibrated in
the general knowledge task should also be most miscalibrated in time series
predictions, and they should also be the ones who overweight their signals
most heavily.
In the next section, we brieﬂy review the relevant literature with an em-
phasis on the methodology to measure the three, potentially diﬀerent vari-
eties of judgmental biases. Section 3 and 4 illustrate the design and proce-
dure of our experiment. Section 5 presents the results. In the ﬁnal section
we summarize and discuss our ﬁndings and conclude.
2 Relevant Literature
2.1 Overconﬁdence
Overconﬁdence has been studied and discussed extensively in the previous
literature using diﬀerent methodologies and various deﬁnitions interchange-
ably. The more recent literature tries to unravel prior inconsistencies and
argues that there are several distinct forms of overconﬁdence. Moore and
Healy (2008), for instance, distinguish between overestimation (overestima-
tion of one’s ability, performance, and level of control), overplacement (over-
estimating the relative performance or ability with respect to others (i.e.,
better-than-average eﬀect), and overprecision (overestimating the accuracy
of one’s beliefs). Hilton et al. (forthcoming) also suggest that overconﬁdence
may take three forms: judgmental overconﬁdence (overestimating precision of
5
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 058one’s judgments), self-enhancement biases (positive illusions such as better-
than-average eﬀect, illusion of control, unrealistic (personal) optimism), and
optimism with respect to societal risks. Miscalibration, the assumed un-
derlying personal trait of individuals regarding overweighting of private in-
formation, is a judgment bias and therefore a manifestation of judgmental
overconﬁdence.
General Knowledge Miscalibration
The ﬁnding that individuals are often miscalibrated was established by the
judgment literature in cognitive psychology (see, e.g., Alpert and Raiﬀa,
1982, Lichtenstein et al., 1982), which employed two basic approaches to
study calibration: individuals are either asked to answer several knowledge
questions with two answer alternatives and state their conﬁdence (i.e., their
subjective probability) that their answer is correct, or they are asked to con-
struct conﬁdence intervals for knowable magnitudes (e.g., length of a river).
Regarding overconﬁdence in the economics and ﬁnance literature, especially
the latter method is of interest because it elicits “judgmental overconﬁdence
(...) in a “pure” way” (Hilton et al., forthcoming). When the interval pro-
duction method is used, the general ﬁnding is that individuals’ conﬁdence
intervals are too narrow: they think they know more about the uncertain
quantities than they actually do know. Miscalibration is therefore often de-
ﬁned as an overestimation of the precision of knowledge. It has been found
that miscalibration on interval production tasks is a stable personal trait
(Hilton et al., forthcoming) with cross-domain consistency (Glaser et al.,
2005), and similar results have been obtained for students and professionals
6
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judgmental overconﬁdence and overprecision are diﬀerent labels for the same
bias (see the discussion in Hilton et al. (forthcoming) or Moore and Healy
(2008)). Following Moore and Healy (2008), we use the term overprecision
in the remainder of the paper whenever we refer to miscalibration based on
interval production methods.
Time Series Miscalibration
Whereas the tasks in the judgment literature in cognitive psychology are
typically comprised of several almanac questions, the tasks in the forecasting
literature usually revolve around diﬀerent types of time series forecasting.
The tasks in the forecasting literature therefore diﬀer from the tasks in the
calibration literature by the serial correlation of its cues and the presence of
history data when a prediction is made (Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989).
Some aspects that have been the focus of attention in forecasting research
are the inﬂuence of data characteristics such as trend, seasonality, and ran-
domness, the inﬂuence of the mode of the task presentation (graphical or
table format), and the inﬂuence of domain-speciﬁc knowledge on time series
forecasting (a comprehensive review of relevant ﬁndings and methodologies
can be found in Lawrence et al. (2006)). These aspects have been inves-
tigated using diﬀerent forecasting formats such as point forecasting, prob-
abilistic forecasting, and interval forecasting. Regarding the latter format,
it has been found that the above mentioned time series characteristics (i.e.,
trend, seasonality, and randomness) as well as the presentation scale of the
series seem to inﬂuence subjects’ prediction intervals (e.g., Lawrence and
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1992). However, the main ﬁnding is – just like in the judgment literature
in cognitive psychology – that individuals are overconﬁdent. That is, their
prediction intervals are generally too narrow (e.g., Lawrence and Makridakis,
1989, Lawrence and O’Connor, 1993, O’Connor and Lawrence, 1989, ¨ Onkal
et al., 2003). Interestingly, Glaser et al. (2005) found a positive correlation
between overprecision scores based on knowledge questions and overprecision
scores based on time series forecasting. This seems to suggest that both tasks
indeed share a common underlying trait.
2.2 (Single) Cue Probability Learning
In the psychological analysis of numerical predictions, cue probability learn-
ing is the central experimental paradigm. In these experiments, subjects
predict an outcome based on a single (or multiple) cue(s) over many rounds.
As Ganzach (2009) notes, two approaches have been used to analyze sub-
jects’ numerical predictions depending on the research focus. On the one
hand, there is the correspondence-based approach of the Social Judgment
Theory literature, which focuses on the correlation between the prediction
and the true outcome (i.e., achievement index). On the other hand, there
is the coherence-based approach, propagated by the Heuristics and Biases
program, which compares subjects’ predictions against the normative least-
square prediction rule: the higher the predictive accuracy of the cue, the
higher should be the extremeness of the prediction; the lower the predictive
accuracy, the more regressive the predictions ought to be. Because economic
8
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adopt the coherence-based approach. Hence, the adequate criterion to ex-
amine subjects’ numerical predictions is the prediction slope.
The main focus of the coherence-based studies lies on aggregated data
and on situational factors that inﬂuence the extremeness of predictions (e.g.,
Czaczkes and Ganzach, 1996, Ganzach, 1993, 1994). As a measure of ex-
tremeness, these studies typically obtain the ratio of the prediction slopes
(i.e., subjects’ predictions regressed on the corresponding cues) to the nor-
mative slope (i.e., true outcome values regressed on the corresponding cues)
and then examine the eﬀect of various feedback and predictor (i.e., cue)
representations. In the present study, we adopt the same methodology but
use the individual prediction slopes as a measure for subjects’ perception of
predictive accuracy of their cues. Subjects who overestimate the predictive
accuracy will make predictions that are too extreme such that their predic-
tion slopes will be too steep. Consequently, these subjects overweight their
signals.2 Using this measure, we are then able to examine whether there is
an empirical relation between overweighting private signals and judgmental
overconﬁdence in interval production tasks based on almanac questions as
well as on time series forecasting.
2Of course, we do not claim that Bayes’ rule is a cognitively valid description of be-
havior. However, when the individual prediction slopes are used as the yardstick (and
therefore Bayes’ rule as the benchmark), an individual overweighting his signals is some-
one who also overestimates the predictive accuracy.
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To examine the above mentioned research question, we employ three diﬀer-
ent judgment tasks based on three types of information and then relate the
resulting measures of overconﬁdence. These tasks form the general design
framework of the experiment and are presented in the following.
General Knowledge Questions
The ﬁrst task is most frequently used in the psychological research on judg-
mental overconﬁdence and has thus been taken up by behavioral and exper-
imental research in economics as well (e.g., Biais et al., 2005, Deaves et al.,
2008, Glaser and Weber, 2007). It employs the interval production method
for general knowledge questions and confronts subjects with almanac ques-
tions that require a numerical answer. A question can be of the following
kind:
What is the average diameter of the moon (in km)?
As an answer, subjects have to state a lower and an upper bound so that
they are 90% sure that the correct answer lies within this interval. Subjects
are also instructed that being 90% sure means that for 9 out of 10 questions
the true answer should lie within the interval. In our experiment, we asked
ten such questions, which can all be found in the Appendix together with
the correct answers. A person who is well-calibrated with respect to own
knowledge states intervals that contain the correct answer in 9 out of 10
cases. Overconﬁdence is indicated by intervals that are too narrow, mean-
ing that the correct answer lies outside the subjective conﬁdence interval for
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is reﬂected in too broad conﬁdence intervals so that the correct answer lies
within the stated interval in all ten questions.3 Thus, the number of times
the correct answer lies outside the stated interval represents an index for a
person’s calibration, or more speciﬁcally, the estimation of the precision of
own knowledge. As a result, the ﬁrst task produces a general knowledge
calibration index ranging from 0 to 10 for each subject, where 1 indicates
well-calibration, 0 reﬂects underconﬁdence, and increasing numbers reﬂect
higher judgmental overconﬁdence (i.e., higher overprecision).
Time Series Forecasts
The second task is methodologically similar to the general knowledge task
because it also employs the interval production method. However, it is con-
ceptionally diﬀerent because it aims at subjects’ estimation of uncertainty
related to time series forecasts. In this task, subjects are presented a time
series of an asset value consisting of 20 periods. They are then asked to state
an upper and lower bound for the asset value in period 24 so that they are
90% sure the true value will fall within this interval. Again, subjects are told
that being 90% sure implies that for 9 out of 10 time series, the true realized
value should be within the stated interval.
In our experiment, all time series were based on an autoregressive, moving
average process with one MA and one AR term. A trend component was
3Since we ask for 90% conﬁdence intervals, there is an obvious asymmetry in the pos-
sibility to identify over- and underconﬁdence. However, we use the same method as many
previous studies to be able to relate our results (e.g., Biais et al., 2005, Glaser and Weber,
2007, Hilton et al., forthcoming, Klayman et al., 1999, Russo and Schoemaker, 1992).
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Figure 1: Example for the task of time series forecasts
not included. The so generated time series constitute an “ideal” forecasting
environment and have frequently been used in forecasting research (see, e.g.,
Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992, 1993). We presented ten such time series that
were pre-generated using diﬀerent parameters for the MA and AR term, but
all time series had a common starting value of 200. One such example is
displayed in Figure 1, where the dashed lines indicate the 90% conﬁdence
interval of the realization in period 24. Subjects were, of course, only shown
the black solid line of period 1 to 20. All ten time series can be found in the
Appendix. The instructions made clear to the subjects that all series were
computer generated and that it was therefore impossible to recognize price
patterns of real assets. In order to compare whether the true realization of
the value in period 24 lay within the stated conﬁdence intervals, the time
series were generated for 24 periods of which only the ﬁrst 20 were presented
12
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Since the interval method employed here is the same as in the ﬁrst task,
again an individual’s calibration index can be obtained but this time with
respect to the estimation of uncertainty related to time series forecasting.
Thus, similar to the ﬁrst task, a time series calibration index is calculated
as the sum of incidents where the actual asset value in period 24 lies outside
the predicted interval. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where 1 indicates well-
calibration, 0 reﬂects underconﬁdence, and values greater than 1 (increasing)
overconﬁdence (i.e., higher overprecision).
Signal-Based Predictions
While the ﬁrst two tasks are frequently used to assess subjects’ (mis)calibration
with respect to knowledge and time series forecasting, our study is the ﬁrst
to relate the obtained measures to a measure of individual signal perception,
or, in other words, to the perceived predictive accuracy of a cue. To do so,
we strongly rely on the wide ﬁeld of numerical prediction in the psychologi-
cal literature, speciﬁcally on single-cue probability learning experiments (e.g.
Czaczkes and Ganzach, 1996, Ganzach, 1993, 1994). In these experiments,
subjects predict an outcome based on a single cue over many rounds, knowing
that the cue is a non-perfect, but unbiased indicator of the outcome value.
This task perfectly captures subjects’ over- or underestimation of the pre-
cision of private information: if subjects overestimate the precision of their
signal (or cue), they overestimate its predictive accuracy and will therefore
make predictions that are closer to the signal than is appropriate. This in-
dicates that the signal is perceived as being too representative of the actual
13
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to as overconﬁdence in behaviorally inspired economic models (e.g., Odean,
1998, Kyle and Wang, 1997, Benos, 1998).
In order to obtain an individual calibration measure in this task, a predic-
tion slope is calculated for each subject by regressing a subject’s predictions
on signals. A normative prediction slope can also be calculated by regress-
ing the true outcome values on the signals. If, for instance, the predictive
accuracy is overestimated, the information contained in the signal is over-
weighted, resulting in a prediction slope larger than the normative slope. In
general, the steeper the prediction slope (in particular when greater than the
normative slope), the higher the overestimation of predictive accuracy.
As in the psychological studies, in our signal-based prediction task sub-
jects have to predict the realization x of a random variable X based on
a signal (or cue) s. The random variable X is normally distributed with
N(585,502).4 The signal s, as indicator for x, is determined by s = x + e,
where e is the realization of a random error term E that is distributed ac-
cording to N(0,502).5 The chosen distributional properties of X and E result
in a correlation between signal and outcome of 0.7 and in a normative slope
of about 0.5.6
In a series of 60 rounds, subjects receive a signal s and have to predict x,
knowing that the signal is a non-perfect, but unbiased indicator of the value
4For reasons of experimental practicality, the distribution was truncated at both ends
at four standard deviations so that actual values x were restricted to the range of 385 to
785.
5Again, this normal distribution was truncated at both ends at four standard devia-
tions.
6We chose these distributional characteristics to be methodologically as close as possible
to the studies by Ganzach and coauthors.
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of the experiment it is important to ensure comparability, so that the values
x and e (and thus signal s) for all 60 rounds were pre-generated and kept
constant across subjects. Also, x and s were generated with the constraint
that the preassigned distributional properties of the two random variables
would approximately be preserved within the ﬁrst, second and third block
of 20 rounds. This latter property allows to account for potential learning
eﬀects in perceived predictive accuracy.
Two treatments were used for the signal-based prediction task that orig-
inate in the two strands of literature we draw upon. The treatments diﬀered
only in the degree of prior information about the underlying distribution
of the outcome variable. In the No-Info treatment, subjects were informed
about the range of possible values for x. However, no explicit information was
given about the distribution from which value x was drawn. This is the stan-
dard procedure used in the studies on single-cue probability learning (e.g.,
Czaczkes and Ganzach, 1996, Ganzach, 1993, 1994). In the Info treatment,
on the other hand, subjects were informed about the distributional character-
istics of the outcome variable. To ensure an appropriate understanding of the
normal distribution, a chart of 1,000 random realizations from the truncated
normal distribution was displayed in the instructions (see Appendix). This
second treatment was chosen because it more closely captures the overcon-
ﬁdence models in the economic literature: agents are assumed to know the
underlying distribution of the central variable (that can be, e.g., the value of
an asset). The key information they misjudge is the precision of their private
7For more details on instructions, see the Appendix.
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the distributional details on the error variance e of the signal.
Additionally, in both treatments, subjects received a list of ten random
draws of x and corresponding signals s prior to starting the task. Thus,
they were able to draw some inferences about the predictive accuracy of the
signals prior to their ﬁrst prediction. In each round, they then received the
signal and made their prediction of the outcome value at their own pace. Af-
ter each prediction, the true outcome value x was revealed and they moved
on to the next round.
Although each of the three presented tasks aims at detecting patterns
of judgmental overconﬁdence, the underlying cognitive processes might be
quite distinct: the general knowledge task uncovers the misperception of own
knowledge, the time series prediction task aims at misperception of uncer-
tainty in time series forecasting, and the signal-based prediction task exposes
misperception of predictive accuracy of signals. Relating the three calibration
measures obtained for each participant will thus clarify whether the synony-
mous use of these constructs as indicators of judgmental overconﬁdence can
be empirically justiﬁed.
4 Procedure
In the experiment, subjects encountered the three tasks in three subsequent
phases. Instructions for the general knowledge task (phase one) and the
time series forecasts (phase two) were jointly given. In a third phase, the
16
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It is not easily possible to provide incentive pay for answering general
knowledge questions and making time series forecasts. Thus, similar to all
other experiments on overconﬁdence, we paid a ﬂat fee of e3 for ﬁnishing
the ﬁrst two tasks. There was no incentive to be very fast in answering the
questions because subjects knew they had to wait until everyone was ready
to start with the next phase.
To provide incentives for the repetitive signal-based prediction task, one
out of the 60 rounds was randomly selected for payment. In this task subjects
earned a ﬂat fee of e6, which was reduced according to the absolute deviation
of their prediction from the true value x. For every integer of deviation,
e0.015 were subtracted from the fee of e6. To facilitate understanding of
this compensation scheme, the instructions contained a payoﬀ table with a
number of examples.8
Participants in the experiment were 168 students from Jena University,
85 females and 83 males. In the third phase, 88 subjects were assigned to
the Info-treatment, 80 to the No-Info treatment. Subjects were recruited
using the software tool ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the experiment was
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The three phases of
the experiment lasted about 1 hour, and average earnings accumulated over
8In principle, a quadratic scoring rule has the preferable property of incentive com-
patibility under the assumption that subjects are risk neutral. Such an assumption is,
however, challenged by the ﬁndings of risk attitude elicitation, which was conducted in
a later phase of the experiment. Moreover, the quadratic scoring rule is diﬃcult to un-
derstand for participants and thus likely overburdens an otherwise rather simple decision.
Sonnemans and Oﬀerman (2001) show that subjects do not exhibit less eﬀort in making
good decisions when being paid with a ﬂat fee instead of a quadratic scoring rule.
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5 Results
First, we report how participants are classiﬁed according to the accuracy
of their judgments in the three tasks and present an overview of average
overconﬁdence. Subsequently, the relation of the three overconﬁdence mea-
sures is examined while controlling for other inﬂuencing factors. Finally, we
look for gender eﬀects that are frequently reported in studies on judgmental
overconﬁdence.
5.1 Descriptive Overview of Overconﬁdence Measures
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the measures of judgmental over-
conﬁdence in all three tasks. Columns (2) and (3) contain the data obtained
from the general knowledge questions and the time series forecasting. In both
of these tasks, subjects were asked to state 90% conﬁdence intervals to ten
questions each. For both tasks, a calibration index is calculated as the num-
ber of times the true values fall outside the stated intervals. As mentioned
above, a well-calibrated individual should have an index of 1.
Overconﬁdence in General Knowledge
The mean calibration index for the general knowledge task is 5.8, indicating
9After completing these stages, subjects participated in two further stages, consisting of
a risk attitude elicitation task and an experimental asset market, which lasted for another
1.5 hours and earned them an additional e12.21, on average. The results of these stages
are reported in a diﬀerent paper.
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correct answers fall outside subjects’ conﬁdence intervals. This is well in line
with prior studies.10 Moreover, Table 1 indicates large individual diﬀerences
in this task with calibration indices ranging from 0 to 10. The overwhelming
majority of our subjects (159 or 94.6%) is overconﬁdent with an index rang-
ing from 2 to 10. Only 5 subjects (or 3.0%) are well-calibrated and 4 subjects
(or 2.4%) are underconﬁdent. The Cronbach’s alpha for the general knowl-
edge calibration index is 0.69, indicating an acceptable psychometric validity.
Overconﬁdence in Time Series Forecasting
The mean calibration index for the time series forecasting task is 1.2, there-
fore indicating only slight overall overconﬁdence in our sample and being
much less than the average calibration index obtained in the general knowl-
edge task. Moreover, the classiﬁcation of our subjects based on the time
series calibration index is much more balanced: about equally many subjects
are overconﬁdent (45 or 26.8%) and well-calibrated (43 or 25.6%); 80 subjects
(or 47.6%) are underconﬁdent. However, it is not the aim of this study to
examine whether and why diﬀerent degrees of overconﬁdence exist between
the general knowledge and the time series forecasting task. Rather, we are
interested in the question whether individuals who are most overconﬁdent
in one task are also most overconﬁdent in another. Thus, we only need a
ranking of our subjects with respect to all overconﬁdence measures, not the
10Russo and Schoemaker (1992), e.g., ﬁnd a percentage of correct answers falling outside
the stated conﬁdence intervals in the range from 42% to 64%. In Hilton et al. (forthcom-
ing), the percentage of answers outside the intervals is between 62% and 78%, and in a
study by Glaser and Weber (2007), the percentage of answers outside the intervals is 75%.
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diﬀerences within each task. And indeed, even though the individual diﬀer-
ences are not as pronounced as in the general knowledge task, they also exist
with respect to time series forecasting. The calibration index for this task
ranges from 0 to 7.11 The Cronbach’s alpha for the time series calibration
index is 0.74, once again indicating an acceptable psychometric validity.
Table 1: Miscalibration measures
General Time series Signal-based
knowledge forecasts predictions
Info No Info
Well Calibrated 1 1 0.5 0.5
No. obs. 168 168 88 80
Mean score (SD) 5.8 (2.4) 1.2 (1.6) 0.65 (0.16) 0.87 (0.14)
Min 0 0 0.36 0.37
Max 10 7 1.02 1.06
# overconﬁdent 159 (94.6%) 45 (26.8%) 65 (73.9%) 77 (96.2%)
# well calibrated 5 (3.0%) 43 (25.6%) 13 (14.8%) 2 (2.5%)
# underconﬁdent 4 (2.4%) 80 (47.6%) 10 (11.4%) 1 (1.3%)
Overconﬁdence in Signal-Based Predictions
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 contain the data obtained from the signal-
based prediction task. In this task, subjects were asked to predict an outcome
11Yet one might argue that a ranking based on the time series calibration index is too
crude since, e.g., 80 of our subjects are underconﬁdent with a calibration index of 0. How-
ever, the use of generated time series has an additional advantage in this respect. Based
on a similar methodology as in Lawrence and O’Connor (1993), we randomly sampled
100 possible outcomes for the value of each time series in period 24. This enables us to
calculate a much ﬁner calibration index for each subject ranging from 0 to 1000. When
this procedure is used, a calibration score of 100 indicates perfect calibration. Nonetheless,
using this calibration index for the time series forecasting task does not change any of the
later results qualitatively. Thus, for reasons of simplicity we present all the results based
on the above described calibration index for the time series forecasting task.
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but unbiased indicator of the outcome value. In the Info treatment (column
4) subjects were informed about the characteristics of the underlying distri-
bution of the outcome value. In the No-Info treatment (column 5), they did
not receive this information. As a measure of perceived predictive accuracy
of the signals, we calculated a prediction slope for each subject by regressing
the predictions in all 60 rounds on the corresponding signals. The normative
slope which minimizes the prediction error can be obtained by regressing the
true outcome values on the signals. The normative slope in this task is ap-
proximately 0.5. Thus, to adhere to the prior labeling, we call an individual
with a prediction slope of 0.5 well-calibrated; a prediction slope greater than
0.5 indicates overestimation of predictive accuracy and thus overconﬁdence;
a prediction slope smaller than 0.5 indicates underestimation of predictive
accuracy and thus underconﬁdence.12
In both treatments, the mean prediction slope is greater than 0.5, indicat-
ing an overestimation of the predictive accuracy of the signals overall. With
an average prediction slope of 0.65, this bias is signiﬁcantly less pronounced
in the Info treatment compared to an average prediction slope of 0.87 in the
No-Info treatment (Wilcoxon rank sum test: p < .01). Thus, even though
subjects in the Info treatment overweight their signals on average, they are
closer to the normative prediction slope because they know the underlying
distribution of the outcome value. Subjects in the No-Info treatment, on the
other hand, were not informed about the distribution from which the out-
12In order to classify an individual as well-calibrated with respect to signal perception,
we set a range for the prediction slope by tolerating a deviation from the normative slope
of ±0.05.
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signals, they might therefore also overestimate the variability (i.e., variance)
of the underlying distribution of the outcome value. Both processes lead to
an overestimation of the predictive accuracy of their signals and thus, to a
greater overweighting bias.
In both treatments large individual diﬀerences are prevalent. In the Info
treatment the prediction slope ranges from 0.36 to 1.02, and in the No-Info
treatment it ranges from 0.37 to 1.06. Accordingly, in the Info treatment
65 subjects (or 73.9%) are classiﬁed as overconﬁdent, 13 subjects (or 14.8%)
as well-calibrated, and 10 subjects (or 11.4%) as underconﬁdent. In the No-
Info treatment, on the other hand, the overwhelming majority (77 subjects
or 96.2%) is overconﬁdent, 2 subjects (or 2.5%) are well-calibrated, and only
1 subject (or 1.3%) is underconﬁdent.
The dynamic nature of the signal-based prediction task allows to investi-
gate whether perception of predictive accuracy changes with task experience.
Figure 2 gives an overview of prediction slopes when the total number of pre-
diction rounds is split into three blocks of 20 rounds. In the Info treatment,
the average prediction slope decreases signiﬁcantly over time (all pairwise
comparisons are signiﬁcant with p < .01 according to Wilcoxon signed ranks
tests), indicating that subjects become better calibrated in the perception
of signal precision in later rounds. In the No-Info treatment, on the other
hand, calibration becomes only slightly better. The average prediction slope
does not diﬀer between the ﬁrst and second block and between the second
and third block (p = .32 and p = .30, respectively). Comparing blocks 1 and
3 reveals signiﬁcantly better calibration in the last block (p = .03).
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Figure 2: Accuracy in signal-based predictions over time
With an average prediction slope of 0.71 in the Info treatment compared
to 0.89 in the No-Info treatment, the diﬀerence between the two treatments
is already signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst block of 20 rounds (Wilcoxon rank sum test:
p < 0.01). In summary, this suggests that knowledge about the underlying
distribution of the outcome value does not only facilitate learning how to be
better calibrated with respect to the perception of predictive accuracy but
also improves the initial calibration.
Before we can investigate the individual stability of overconﬁdence across
tasks, we have to examine whether the rank ordering of our subjects in the
signal-based prediction task is stable. Because learning is involved in the
task, subjects who highly overestimate the predictive accuracy of the signals
in the ﬁrst rounds, for example, might improve their predictions more than
other subjects in the later rounds and vice versa. If this is the case, the
rank ordering of our subjects would diﬀer between diﬀerent stages of the
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rounds into three blocks of 20 and calculate the prediction slope for each
subject in each block. Based on these prediction slopes, we then compute all
pairwise Spearman correlation coeﬃcients between the three blocks as well
as the Spearman correlations between each block and the prediction slopes
based on all 60 rounds. Table 2 contains the results. Even though there is an
overall learning eﬀect in the signal-based prediction task, stable individual
diﬀerences are prevalent across the blocks. All pairwise correlations between
blocks are positive and signiﬁcant, ranging from 0.65 to 0.84 for the Info
treatment and from 0.45 to 0.73 for the No-Info treatment. Thus, subjects
who are relative overweighters of signals at the beginning of the task are
likely to be relative overweighters at the end of the task as well. Moreover,
the prediction slopes of each block are highly correlated with the prediction
slopes based on all 60 rounds, ranging from 0.88 to 0.94 in the Info treat-
ment and from 0.73 to 0.88 in the No-Info treatment. This suggests that the
average slope based on the predictions in all 60 rounds is a good summary
statistic regarding overweighting of private information for each subject.
5.2 Relation of Overconﬁdence Measures
5.2.1 General Knowledge and Time Series Forecasting
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of overconﬁdence scores based on the
general knowledge and time series forecasting task. In addition to the com-
mon miscalibration measure, the correlation matrix also includes an interval
24
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 058Table 2: Spearman correlations between prediction slopes
Treatment Slopes Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total
Info Block 1 –
Block 2 0.74??? –
Block 3 0.65??? 0.84??? –
Total 0.88??? 0.94??? 0.90??? –
No Info Block 1 –
Block 2 0.52??? –
Block 3 0.45??? 0.73??? –
Total 0.73??? 0.87??? 0.88??? –
??? signiﬁcant at 0.01
width and accuracy score for both tasks. These measures allow for a more
detailed assessment of miscalibration. Subjects’ interval width scores are cal-
culated by ranking the interval width across participants for each item and
summing the ranks for each subject across the ten questions of each task.
Thus, the higher a subject’s interval width score, the wider his conﬁdence
intervals tend to be, relative to those of the other subjects. The accuracy
score is obtained by the same procedure, but instead of the interval width,
the ranking of subjects is now based on the absolute distance between the
midpoint of the stated interval and the true answer. Thus, the higher a sub-
ject’s accuracy score, the farther away his midpoints tend to be from the true
answers.
As expected, a tendency to use wider intervals in the general knowledge
and time series forecasting task is related to lower miscalibration scores in
each task (r = −0.70, p < 0.01 and r = −0.79, p < 0.01, respectively).
Similarly, the farther the midpoints from the true answers, the higher the
miscalibration score in each task (r = 0.25, p < 0.01 and r = 0.26, p < 0.01,
respectively). Interestingly, we also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
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task (r = 0.22, p < 0.01), which indicates that the farther away the interval
midpoints from the true answer, the wider the intervals tend to be. This
suggests that subjects rightly react to a higher degree of uncertainty by
widening their conﬁdence intervals. However, a widening of the intervals
is not suﬃcient to adjust for the greater deviation of their midpoints, as
the positive correlation between the accuracy score and the miscalibration
measure indicates.
Most importantly for our study, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between
the two miscalibration measures (r = .50, p < 0.01). Subjects with a high
miscalibration score in the general knowledge task tend to be the subjects
with a high miscalibration score in the time series task. This suggests that
both measures capture a common construct which is in line with prior studies
(see, e.g., Glaser et al., 2005). Additionally, the interval width score based on
the general knowledge task is signiﬁcantly correlated with the miscalibration
score based on the time series forecasting task (r = −.54, p < 0.01) and vice
versa (r = −.57, p < 0.01). Thus, subjects who state narrower intervals in
one task also have a higher miscalibration score in the other. This, too, sug-
gests that both miscalibration tasks measure a common construct, which is
based on a general tendency to use narrow intervals. We therefore generalize
the results of Hilton et al. (forthcoming), who ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation
between interval width and miscalibration scores across two diﬀerent general
knowledge scales.
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Scores based Scores based
on Knowledge on Time Series
Knowledge Time Series I.Width Acc.Sc. I.Width Acc.Sc.
Miscalibration Measures
Knowledge –
Time Series 0.50??? –
Scores based on Knowledge
Interval Width −0.70??? −0.54??? –
Accuracy Score 0.25??? 0.04 0.22??? –
Scores based on Time Series
Interval Width −0.57??? −0.79??? 0.63??? 0.04 –
Accuracy Score 0.00 0.26??? −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 –
Note: Correlation coeﬃcients are based on all data (n=168). ??? indicates signiﬁcance at 0.01.
5.2.2 Correlations with Signal-Based Predictions
Table 4 shows the Spearman correlations between diﬀerent measures of over-
conﬁdence based on the ﬁrst two tasks and the prediction slopes, separately
for treatment Info and No-Info. Columns (1) and (2) contain simple pairwise
correlations while columns (3) to (6) contain partial correlations. For the par-
tial correlations we control for the inﬂuence of gender, age, and semester as
well as the remaining measures of miscalibration for which a correlation coef-
ﬁcient is reported in each particular column. Thus, the correlations between
the general knowledge miscalibration score and prediction slope in columns
(3) and (5), for instance, are the partial correlations between both measures
while controlling for gender, age, semester, and time series miscalibration.
Regarding the correlations between both of these measures in columns (4)
and (6), we additionally control for the interval width scores in the general
knowledge and time series forecasting task.
As shown in the table, prediction slopes and measures of miscalibration
in the general knowledge task are not correlated. Between time series mis-
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relation in the Info treatment only. This suggests that in the Info treatment
participants with a higher miscalibration score in the time series forecast-
ing task tend to overweight their signals more heavily in the signal-based
prediction task. The correlation coeﬃcient is rather small, though (between
.26 and .31). Moreover, when controlling for interval width, the correla-
tion between time series miscalibration and the prediction slope in the Info
treatment becomes only marginally signiﬁcant (r = .19, p = .085). Partial
correlations between interval width and prediction slopes are never signif-
icant. Thus, subjects who tend to state narrower intervals in the general
knowledge or time series forecasting task do not systematically overweight
their signals more heavily. This is surprising as the interval width score cor-
responds most closely to Moore and Healy’s (2008) “overprecision,” the type
of overconﬁdence usually assumed to be the underlying trait of individuals
who overweight their private information. In general, the correlation results
in Table 4 suggest that judgmental overconﬁdence assessed through conﬁ-
dence interval production methods, on the one hand, and assessed through
overweighting of externally given signals, on the other, are two distinct con-
structs.
5.3 Gender Diﬀerences in Overconﬁdence
Finally, we investigate whether the degree of overconﬁdence diﬀers between
men and women, as claimed by some previous literature (e.g., Barber and
Odean, 2001). Table 5 contains means and medians of our overconﬁdence
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diction slopes
Simple Correlations Partial Correlations
Info No-Info Info No-Info
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Slope Slope Slope Slope Slope Slope
Measures based on Knowledge
Miscalibration 0.17 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 0.18
(0.109) (0.409) (0.786) (0.602) (0.237) (0.112)
Interval Width – – – -0.05 – 0.09
(0.625) (0.460)
Measures based on Time Series
Miscalibration 0.31??? -0.05 0.26?? 0.19? -0.10 0.02
(0.003) (0.644) (0.015) (0.085) (0.384) (0.869)
Interval Width – – – 0.01 – 0.09
(0.895) (0.446)
Note: For the partial Spearman correlations other additional control variables not included in the
table are gender, age, and semester. ??? signiﬁcant at 0.01, ?? signiﬁcant at 0.05, ? signiﬁcant at 0.10
measures separately for men and women as well as the number of observations
in each task. The last column of Table 5 contains the p-values of a Mann-
Whitney U test, where the null hypothesis is equality of populations. We
found a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of average overconﬁdence between men and
women in the general knowledge task only. In this task, women have a higher
miscalibration score than men (6.18 vs. 5.43, p = 0.03). However, as the
comparison of the interval width score indicates, this is not due to a general
tendency of women to use narrower intervals than men. Rather, the higher
miscalibration of women in this task can be ascribed to a lower accuracy of
their judgments, as the higher value of the accuracy score indicates (965.11 vs.
804.37, p < 0.01). Thus, on average, women’s interval midpoints are farther
away from the correct answers than the interval midpoints of men. In this
sense, given their knowledge, women in our sample are more overconﬁdent
than men in the general knowledge task. Regarding overconﬁdence measures
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Male Female p-value
Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs
Measures based on Knowledge 83
Miscalibration 5.43 5 83 6.18 7 85 0.03??
Interval Width 875.85 881.5 83 894.91 879.5 85 0.93
Accuracy Score 804.37 803 83 965.11 961 85 0.00???
Measures based on Time Series
Miscalibration 1.05 0 83 1.26 1 85 0.52
Interval Width 913.89 869.5 83 876.26 892 85 0.62
Accuracy Score 889.36 868.5 83 867.39 851.5 85 0.68
Prediction slopes
Treatment Info 0.62 0.62 43 0.67 0.64 45 0.15
Treatment No-Info 0.87 0.94 40 0.87 0.88 40 0.32
??? signiﬁcant at 0.01, ?? signiﬁcant at 0.05. p-values are based on Mann-Whitney U tests.
based on the time series forecasting task as well as the signal-based prediction
task, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences.
6 Summary and Discussion
In behavioral economics and ﬁnance, overweighting private information is a
bias that is often used as an explanation for empirical phenomena of detri-
mental decision making, like the winner’s curse or strategies of excessive
trading. In theoretical modeling, it is usually captured by (overconﬁdent)
agents who overestimate the precision of their private signals. In empirical
tests of these models, however, it is generally assumed that the modeled bias
resembles a speciﬁc type of overconﬁdence identiﬁed in the calibration liter-
ature in cognitive psychology where individuals are asked to state conﬁdence
intervals for general knowledge questions. We have put this assumption to
the test. Based on the psychological literature on forecasting, we argue that
diﬀerent cognitive mechanisms might be triggered in tasks involving uncer-
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in almanac questions) and in tasks involving uncertainty that is located ex-
ternally (like assessing the precision of signals about an asset value). The
lack of empirical support for economic models of overconﬁdence (e.g., in the
area of trading) might thus originate in divergent empirical and theoretical
constructs of judgmental overconﬁdence.
We employ three types of judgment tasks and investigate whether over-
conﬁdence measures obtained in these tasks are correlated. The ﬁrst two
tasks are established in the overconﬁdence literature and require to state
subjective conﬁdence intervals for answers to general knowledge questions
and time series forecasts. We introduce a third type of task, signal-based
predictions, which borrows the methodology from the psychological litera-
ture on single-cue probability learning. In so doing, we obtain a measure
for overweighting private signals that closely resembles overconﬁdence in the
way it is captured in economic models. If the assumption of one underlying
personal trait in all three tasks holds, individuals who are most overconﬁdent
in one task should also be most overconﬁdent in the other tasks.
Similar to the previous literature, we ﬁnd, on average, substantial over-
conﬁdence in the general knowledge task and, to a lesser degree, also in
the time series forecasting task. In the signal-based prediction task, over-
conﬁdence is also prevalent overall. However, we observe a lower degree of
overconﬁdence when subjects know about the distribution of the outcome
variable they have to predict (Info treatment) than when they do not know
about this distribution (No-Info treatment). In the latter treatment, two
possible sources for overestimating predictive accuracy of signals come into
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overestimating the variability of the outcome distribution (or both). Yet,
notwithstanding the exact sources of overestimating the predictive accuracy
of signals, it is important to note that both treatments uncover overweighting
of signals (i.e., overconﬁdence in signal perception).
Regarding gender diﬀerences, we cannot conﬁrm the often raised claim
that men are more overconﬁdent than women (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001).
For most of our overconﬁdence measures we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant gender
diﬀerences, which is in line with some prior studies (see, e.g., Gigerenzer et al.,
1991). In the general knowledge task, however, we ﬁnd that women are more
miscalibrated than men. This is not due to a general tendency of women to
use narrower intervals than men but to a lower accuracy of their judgments.
Women therefore seem to be more overconﬁdent than men in the general
knowledge task.
Relating overconﬁdence across the judgmental tasks reveals that measures
of miscalibration based on a general knowledge and time series forecasting
task are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated. Thus, subjects who tend
to be most overconﬁdent in the general knowledge task tend to be most
overconﬁdent in the time series forecasting task as well. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that interval width scores are correlated with miscalibration measures across
the two diﬀerent tasks, suggesting that miscalibration is due to a general
tendency to use narrow intervals. In sum, those results indicate that both
tasks indeed uncover one underlying personal trait, which closely corresponds
to Moore and Healy’s (2008) “overprecision” (i.e., narrow intervals).
With respect to signal-based predictions, however, the assumption of one
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sures of miscalibration seem to be unrelated. Only in one of our two treat-
ments for signal-based predictions do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between
overweighting of signals and time series miscalibration. The correlation is
rather small, though, and after controlling for interval width, it becomes only
marginally signiﬁcant. Moreover, interval width scores are not signiﬁcantly
correlated with measures regarding the weighting of signals. This is particu-
larly surprising as the interval width scores most closely capture the type of
overconﬁdence assumed to be the underlying trait of individuals who over-
weight their private information. In general, this suggests that overweighting
of private information and overconﬁdence assessed through conﬁdence inter-
val production methods are two distinct biases. Hence, we conclude that
a discrepancy exists between modeling and measuring overconﬁdence in the
economic literature.
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The following ten questions were used in the general knowledge task. Correct
answers are in parentheses.
1. What is the length of the river Nile in km? (6,671 km)
2. How many states are currently (Nov. 2009) members of the OPEC?
(12)
3. What is the average diameter of the moon in km? (3,745 km)
4. What was the number of inhabitants of Australia in 2008 (in Mill.)?
(21.374 Mill.)
5. What is the number of passenger airports in Germany? (38)
6. What was the number of patent applications in Germany in 2008?
(62,417)
7. What is the size of France in km2? (674,843 km2)
8. What is the air distance between London and Tokio in km? (9,581 km)
9. When was the novel Robinson Crusoe by Daniel Defoe ﬁrst published?
(1719)
10. When was the zip fastener patent-registered? (1893)
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The following ten time series to be used in the time series forecasting task
were pre-generated using an autoregressive, moving average process with one
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